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MUSIC MARKETS AND MYTHOLOGIES 
HENRY H. PERRITT, JR. 
ABSTRACT 
New technologies have started a revolution in the music marketplace.  As new 
business models emerge, major firms in the popular music industry have mounted a 
campaign on the premise that the world of popular music faces a grave threat from 
illicit filing sharing.  This article makes the case against that campaign.  It discusses 
how new technologies are currently reshaping the marketplace to allow a wider 
range of new artists, as well as more direct access between musicians and their fans.  
It also predicts how future demand for popular music will increase due to portability, 
and ultimately recommends directions for marketplace reform and the application of 
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MUSIC MARKETS AND MYTHOLOGIES 
HENRY H. PERRITT, JR.* 
INTRODUCTION 
The revolution in the marketplace for music is in its early stages.  New 
technologies make available new ways to perform creation, intermediation, and 
consumption activities.1  Some emerging enterprises are experimenting with new 
business models for connecting musicians with their fans.2  As in the early days of e-
commerce, circa 1998, it is too soon to know who will become hugely successful and 
who will fade from the scene.  It is possible, however, to estimate the basic features of 
the new marketplace.  It will not look at all like the old one. 
Confronted with change, the major firms in the popular music industry3 have 
mounted a major public-relations and litigation campaign premised on the idea that 
the world of popular music is under a grave threat.4  This article debunks the myth 
propagated by dominant players in the current music industry that the problem is 
illicit file sharing.  It explains how new technologies based on more powerful personal 
computers (“PCs”), portable music players, and the Internet are reshaping the 
marketplace for popular music so as to facilitate more direct access between 
                                                                                                                                     
* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law.  The author is a songwriter who uses new 
technologies to record his music and then to make the music available through Internet-based 
intermediaries.  See MODOFAC, http://www.modofac.com (last visited May 24, 2010); Modofac on 
MySpace Music, MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com/modofacprof (last visited May 24, 2010); 
Modofac, Wind Will Fill the Sails, CD BABY, http://www.cdbaby.com/cd/modofac; http://www.cdbaby. 
com/found?artist=&soundlike=&album=fire+for+colors&style= (last visited May 24, 2010) (search 
for “Fire for the Colors” or “Tim Sandusky”); ITUNES, http://www.apple.com/itunes (last visited May 
24, 2010) (search for “Modofac” in iTunes Store).  He appreciates stimulating discussions about the 
future of music with his music collaborators Tim Sandusky, Jamie Gallagher, Aaron Allietta, and 
Darren Garvey, with indie musicians Dick Prall and Evan Sult, with his colleagues Graeme 
Dinwoodie, Tim Holbrook, Ron Staudt, Mickie Piatt, Ed Harris, and Richard Warner, with music 
attorney Albert Gieseman, and with his present and former students Ben Shanbaum, Matt Topic, 
and Kurt Iselt.  The author’s involvement with business models and the role of IP in the 
entertainment industry proceeds from his having written and produced a rock opera, You Took 
Away My Flag:  A Musical About Kosovo, which played to four sold-out houses and favorable 
audience reaction at Strawdog Theatre in Chicago in June, 2009, and was reopened for an eight-
week run at Theatre Building Chicago in 2010. See YOU TOOK AWAY MY FLAG – A MUSICAL ABOUT 
KOSOVO, www.youtookawaymyflag.com (last visited June 20, 2010).  
1 See Jon Pareles, A World of Megabeats and Megabytes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2010, at AR1. 
2 See id. 
3 1 ROBERT LIND ET AL., ENTERTAINMENT LAW 3D:  LEGAL CONCEPTS AND 
BUSINESS PRACTICES § 1.142 (2008) (noting that the Recording Industry Association of America 
represents the interests of the recording industry); Frank Ahrens, Music Industry Sues Online Song 
Swappers; Trade Group Says First Batch of Lawsuits Targets 261 Major Offenders, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 9, 2003, at A01 (noting that the Recording Industry Association of America represents the 
music industry’s five largest music companies of Universal Music, Sony Music Entertainment, 
Warner Music Group, BMG Entertainment and EMI). 
4 RIAA to Stop Mass Lawsuits, ROLLING STONE, Feb. 5, 2009, at 18 (“After suing 35,000 people 
since September 2003 for illegally sharing music files online, the Recording Industry Association of 
America announced in December that it has halted its controversial lawsuit campaign.”).  
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musicians and their fans.  It predicts that the overall demand for popular music will 
continue to increase because music is becoming more portable, that opportunities will 
increase for “indie” musicians,5 even as the fortunes of the major record labels are 
eclipsed.  It concludes by recommending some general directions for reform and 
application of copyright law in the new marketplace, and by describing new business 
models and labor markets for musicians. 
I.  THE MYTH VERSUS THE FACTS 
If one were to believe the drumbeat of the major music labels, the world of music 
is facing a catastrophe.  A future without music looms unless intellectual property 
laws are strengthened to expand the labels’ control over how music is distributed and 
consumed.  Their message comprises four propositions: 
CDs (“Compact Discs”) are music.  The major labels publicize declines in CD 
sales as though those declines represent a decline in the willingness of consumers to 
pay for music.6  
The major labels promote art.  They characterize their own interests as 
equivalent to the interests of musicians.7 
Thieves are ruining everything.  Consumers are less willing to pay for music and 
thus reward artists for their artistic efforts, the labels say, because of the misconduct 
of “thieves”—pirates who sell music of others below the cost of creating it and 
depraved high-school and college students who proliferate free copies.8 
Protecting copyright should be at the center of American foreign policy.  They 
are distorting American foreign policy, inducing public officials to move intellectual 
                                                                                                                                     
5 “Indie” musicians are independent musicians without major record label deals.  Stephen Lee, 
Re-Examining the Concept of the ‘Independent’ Record Company:  The Case of Wax Trax!  Records, 
14 POPULAR MUSIC 13, 13 (1995). 
6 See Piracy:  Online and on the Street, RECORDING INDUSTRY ASS’N AM., http://www.riaa.com/ 
physicalpiracy.php (last visited May 24, 2010) (“It’s commonly known as piracy, but it’s a too benign 
term that doesn’t even begin to adequately describe the toll that music theft takes on the many 
artists, songwriters, musicians, record label employees and others whose hard work and great talent 
make music possible.”).   
7 See Who We Are, RECORDING INDUSTRY ASS’N AM., http://riaa.com/aboutus.php (last visited 
May 24, 2010). 
The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) is the trade 
organization that supports and promotes the creative and financial vitality of the 
major music companies.  Its members are the music labels that comprise the most 
vibrant record industry in the world.  RIAA® members create, manufacture 
and/or distribute approximately 85% of all legitimate recorded music produced 
and sold in the United States.   
In support of this mission, the RIAA works to protect the intellectual 
property and First Amendment rights of artists . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
8 Michael Carney, File Sharers Sued; Music Industry Cracks Down on Internet ‘Piracy’, WASH. 
TIMES, July 16, 2003, at A2; see Ann Bartow, Electrifying Copyright Norms and Making Cyberspace 
More Like a Book, 48 VILL. L. REV. 13, 58–59 (2003). 
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property protection to near the top of the list of priorities for negotiations with major 
powers such as China, Russia and India, and with scores of developing nations.9 
The facts are out of synch with the drumbeat.  
The real goal is to stifle competition enabled by new technologies.  The major 
labels’ trade association, the Recording Industry Association of America (“RIAA”), 
has filed some 20,000 lawsuits, most against individuals engaged in file sharing.10  
Most of the suits do not go to trial because the RIAA employs contract collection 
agencies that threaten the defendants with ruin unless they “settle” for $8,000 to 
$10,000, depending on the apparent wealth and income of the defendant.11  The 
courts have been sluggish in punishing such abusive practices.12  It’s as though the 
law had empowered typewriter manufacturers to launch a blizzard of lawsuits to 
discourage the early use of word-processing software and hardware. 
The avalanche of litigation is only the latest in a long tradition of major interests 
in the music industry trying to stifle competition resulting from new technology. 
Music rights holders fought phonographs13 and music radio in its early days.14  The 
major labels were found by the Federal Trade Commission to have violated the anti-
trust laws in the late 1990s by prohibiting retailers from selling music CDs at 
discounted prices.15  The industry’s campaign against use of the new technologies 
began before it was possible to buy music in digital formats.  The industry had made 
sure of that by refusing to offer its catalog in any of the new formats until relatively 
recently.16  
                                                                                                                                     
9 See David Lague, U.S. Official Presses China to Punish Piracy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/15/business/worldbusiness/15yuan.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx
=1267293993-zEThyTWvQA+06mRJqIqN+Q (reporting on U.S. Commerce Secretary’s call to China 
to reduce infringement of U.S. intellectual property). 
10 File Sharing, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., http://www.eff.org/issues/file-sharing (last 
visited May 24, 2010) (describing the abusive nature of music-label litigation); see ELEC. FRONTIER 
FOUND., RIAA V. THE PEOPLE:  FIVE YEARS LATER 4–5 (2008), http://www.eff.org/files/eff-riaa-
whitepaper.pdf (describing litigation and collection practices).  
11 See David Canton, Peer-to-Peer Filing Sharing Now a Fact of Internet Life, LONDON FREE 
PRESS (Ontario), Nov. 3, 2008, at BM5 (explaining that the RIAA threatens “individuals with 
expensive litigation . . . that leaves a lay person with no alternative but to settle for amounts 
ranging from $3,000 to $11,000”). 
12 See Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 928–39 (9th Cir. 2006) (rejecting Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claims against satellite television service that sent more 
than 10,000 demand letters to consumers asserting legal claims that were “weak”). 
13 See Stern v. Rosey, 17 App. D.C. 562, 564–66 (D.C. Cir. 1901) (affirming dismissal of suit by 
music rights holder against seller of phonograph wax cylinders). 
14 See, e.g., Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 195–202 (1931) (holding that, in 
suit for injunction against a hotel, radio broadcasts of copyrighted songs made available to hotel 
guests, constituted a “public performance” of the works). 
15 See Market for Prerecorded Music, Statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky & 
Commissioners Sheila F. Anthony, Mozelle W. Thompson, Orson Swindle, & Thomas B. Leary, FED. 
TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/09/musicstatement.htm (last visited May 24, 2010); 
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Record Companies Settle FTC Charges of Restraining 
Competition in CD Music Mkt.:  All Five Major Music Distributors Agree to Abandon Advertising 
Pricing Policies (May 10, 2000), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/05/cdpres.shtm. 
16 See, e.g., Patrick Foster, Record Companies Have a Trick Up Their Sleeve for Downloads; 
Big Four Challenge Apple with Online Album Format, THE TIMES (London), Aug. 8, 2009, at 28, 
available at http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/media/article6788159. 
ece. 
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The major record labels would not, of course, have attained their present size if 
they did not perform a useful function in the market.  The problem they face, 
however, is not that they suddenly are under attack by teenage pirates; the problem 
is that the intermediation activities they have organized their bureaucracies to 
perform have become obsolete because of new technologies.  In a music marketplace 
characterized by live performances in huge venues, recording of music on analog 
tape, sales of recorded music on physical artifacts such as vinyl records, cassette 
tapes and CDs, and over-the-air radio broadcasts, the major labels aggregated capital 
for capital-intensive recording sessions and concert promotion and production.17  
They selected what they thought were the best among hundreds of thousands of 
aspiring musicians and signed “record deals” with them, managed the manufacturing 
process for the physical recordings, advertised their rock stars and other talent 
through their network of paid contacts with radio stations, music reviewers, and 
brick-and-mortar retailers, and warehoused and distributed the physical 
recordings.18 
But the institutional context in which the major labels have a comparative 
advantage is melting away like an iceberg under them.19  The threat they face is not 
one of attack on their property, but irrelevance.  Analysis of the relative cost and 
efficiency of old versus new methods for selecting, recording, performing, 
distributing, and promoting music shows that a new architecture for the music 
marketplace is emerging quickly, an architecture which has little need for what the 
major labels do well.20 
Music revenue is increasing even as sales of physical units decline.  To be sure, 
revenue from CD sales has declined dramatically, and the decline continues, often 
accelerating, with each recent reporting period.21  Music consumers prefer 
downloadable digital files to CDs, but the revenue potential of digital sales is 
insufficient to support the same business model that was built on CDs.22  Sales of 
CDs have declined every year from 2004 to 2008, by 8% from 2004–2005, 12% from 
2005–2006, 17% from 2006–2007, 25% from 2007–2008, and 20.5% from 2008–2009.23  
                                                                                                                                     
17 See PATRICK BURKART & TOM MCCOURT, DIGITAL MUSIC WARS:  OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 
OF THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 18 (2006). 
18 See id.  
19 See The Music Industry:  From Major to Minor, ECONOMIST, Jan. 12, 2008, at 80. 
20 See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., New Architectures for Music:  Law Should Get Out of the Way, 29 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 259, 320 (2007) (exploring changing economics of music production, 
distribution and consumption, and relationship between these changes and copyright law). 
21 See RECORDING INDUS. ASS’N OF AM., 2008 YEAR-END SHIPMENT STATISTICS, 
MANUFACTURER’S UNIT SHIPMENTS AND RETAIL DOLLAR VALUE (2008), http://76.74.24.142/ 
D5664E44-B9F7-69E0-5ABD-B605F2EB6EF2.pdf [hereinafter RIAA 2008] (showing a 26.6% decline 
in CD sales from 2007 to 2008); RECORDING INDUS. ASS’N OF AM., 2006 RIAA MID-YEAR STATISTICS, 
MANUFACTURER’S UNIT SHIPMENTS AND DOLLAR VALUE (2006), http://76.74.24.142/0E3C72C6-
4D76-AA00-E4E0-C62025A87126.pdf [hereinafter RIAA 2006] (showing a 13.9% decline in CD unit 
sales for the first-six months of 2006, compared with a similar period of 2005).  
22 See Glenn Peoples, Analysis:  The Digital Revenue Slowdown, BILLBOARD.BIZ (Sept. 8, 
2009), http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/content_display/industry/e3ia3f2289d03ed2216c96c78087debf9
f1. 
23 RECORDING INDUS. ASS’N OF AM., 2007 YEAR-END SHIPMENT STATISTICS, MANUFACTURERS’ 
UNIT SHIPMENTS AND RETAIL DOLLAR VALUE (2007), http://76.74.24.142/81128FFD-028F-282E-
1CE5-FDBF16A46388.pdf [hereinafter RIAA 2007]; see RIAA 2008, supra note 21; RECORDING 
INDUS. ASS’N OF AM., 2009 YEAR-END SHIPMENT STATISTICS, MANUFACTURERS’ UNIT SHIPMENTS 
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Sales for 2008 were down 55%, compared with 1998.24  Revenue from CD sales was 
down by a similar amount.25  Over the same five years unit sales of digital singles 
increased by 163% for 2004–2005, 60% for 2005–2006, 38% from 2006–2007, 28% 
from 2007–2008, and 9.2% from 2008–2009 and revenue from sales of digital singles 
increased by the similar percentages.26  Unit sales of digital albums increased 198% 
from 2004–2005, 103% from 2005–2006, 54% from 2006–2007, 34% from 2007–2008, 
and 20.2% from 2008–2009 with revenue from sales of digital albums up by similar 
amounts.27 
Moreover—and this is the important part—the total number of digital sales was 
over 1 billion in 2009, exceeding 385 million total shipments of CDs.28  Digital album 
sales were much less—76 million.29 
This shows, not a decline in the willingness of consumers to buy music, but a 
shift in consumer preferences from physical to digital formats, and to singles as 
opposed to albums.30  The hemorrhaging of major-label revenue may threaten the 
interests of the labels, but it does not prove that the music world is being savaged by 
thieves.  It shows that consumers are willing to buy music.  But it also shows that 
they prefer more convenient formats, that they resist having the songs they want 
being tied to songs they do not want, and that they want the prices they are charged 
to reflect the much lower costs of production and distribution which new technologies 
make possible.  
Despite the explosion in demand for downloadable digital formats, the revenue 
flows are much less than for CDs.31  Total revenues from digital sales were $2 billion 
in 2009, compared to $4.2 billion for CDs shipped in the same year.32  This reflects a 
generally lower price for digital formats (averaging just under $1 for digital singles) 
compared with CDs (averaging just over $14 for albums—almost all CD sales are 
album sales), and the consumer preference for singles.33 
Other realities limit the revenue potential of downloadable digital formats.  
They are available from multiple sites on the Internet, some licensed, some not, 
directly from musicians on their websites34 or on their MySpace35 and YouTube 
                                                                                                                                     
AND RETAIL DOLLAR VALUE (2009), http://76.74.24.142/A200B8A7-6BBF-EF15-3038-582014919F78. 
pdf [hereinafter RIAA 2009]. 
24 See Edna Gundersen, Moving in All Directions; Sales Slides, Pirates Aplenty, Microtrends in 
Pop – All Altered by the Internet, USA TODAY, Dec. 29, 2009, § Life, at 1D. 
25 RIAA 2009, supra note 23 (reporting revenue down 21.9% from 2008); RIAA 2008, supra note 
21 (reporting physical CD shipments down 26.6% and Total Retail Revenue for physical shipments 
down 27%); see also RIAA 2007, supra note 23 (showing ten-year numbers that illustrate the 
gradual decline of physical sales). 
26 RIAA 2009, supra note 23; RIAA 2008, supra note 21; RIAA 2007, supra note 23. 
27 RIAA 2009, supra note 23; RIAA 2008, supra note 21; RIAA 2007, supra note 23. 
28 RIAA 2009, supra note 23; RIAA 2008, supra note 21. 
29 RIAA 2009, supra note 23. 
30 See id. 
31 See id. 
32 Id. 
33 RIAA 2008, supra note 21 (taking the “Dollar Value” of both digital singles and physical CDs 
for 2008 and dividing it by “Units Shipped” for 2008 yielded an average price of $0.99 per digital 
download and $14.22 per CD). 
34 E.g., COLDPLAY, http://www.coldplay.com/recordings.php (last visited May 25, 2010). 
35 MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com/ (last visited May 25, 2010). 
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pages,36 as well as from music services such as iTunes.37  This results in a much more 
competitive market structure at the retail level, which puts continuing pressure on 
prices.  It also makes it likely that musicians, their fans, and their promoters will 
make some of their music available for downloading for free. 
Manufacturing and distribution costs are approaching zero.  Apple iTunes is 
able to sell digital music at $0.99 per song and artists are able to sell songs for less 
than that and still make money because the combination of digital formats, the 
Internet, and pervasive e-commerce utilities, have reduced the cost of reproducing 
and distributing music almost to zero, jerking the rug out from under a business 
model in which manufacturing and distribution costs dwarf other cost elements.38  In 
addition, the same and related technologies have dramatically reduced the costs of 
producing music, rendering obsolete other aspects of the business model in which 
access to capital-intensive recording and mastering has to be rationed to allow access 
only to those with the highest probability of producing blockbuster songs.39 
Advertising and promotion must be performed through new channels.  Outreach 
to potential fans through the Internet and blog reaction to new music has become 
more important than traditional advertising channels, rendering mostly obsolete 
expertise, relationships and embedded capital tied to old channels.  As reduced 
barriers to entry increase the supply of music available to consumers, and as 
portability of music increases demand, tools to help consumers find new music have 
become even more important than before, but the relevant tools are new and have 
different economics from the old approaches of promotion and payola.  
Tied sales of songs are unpopular.  In 2009, 94% of the digital sales (by unit) 
were singles and 6% were albums. By contrast, in the same year, 99.7% of the 
physical CD sales were albums and 0.3% were singles.40  Consumers now can 
purchase only the songs they want rather than having to purchase a collection of 
songs bundled by the dozen on CDs.41  The CD format ties less popular songs (or 
those the sellers believe would be less popular) to more popular songs.  Now that 
consumers are free to purchase only what they want, they buy fewer copies of the less 
popular songs.  Suppliers no longer can “push” songs by tying them to the coattails of 
other songs.  This is not a bad thing for consumers, but it reduces revenue for 
suppliers of less popular songs. 
Based on RIAA figures, consumers bought 37 million fewer CD albums in the 
first half of 2006 than in the first half of 2005.42  They bought 119 million more 
digital singles and 6.5 million more digital albums.43  That is about 30 million fewer 
                                                                                                                                     
36 YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com (last visited May 25, 2010). 
37 See ITUNES, http://www.apple.com/itunes/ (last visited May 25, 2010). 
38 Christopher Sprigman, The 99¢ Question, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 87, 87–89 
(2006). 
39 See Mark F. Schultz, Live Performance, Copyright, and the Future of the Music Business, 43 
U. RICH. L. REV. 685, 689–90 (2009). 
40 RIAA 2009, supra note 23 (reporting total digital single sales of 1138.3 million; total digital 
album sales of 76.4 million; total physical CD single sales of 0.9 million; total physical album sales of 
292.0 million). 
41 See Jeff Leeds, With CD Sales Falling, Labels Seek New Deals with Apple, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
26, 2007, at C1 [hereinafter Leeds, CD Sales Falling].  
42 RIAA 2006, supra note 21. 
43 Id. 
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album sales.44  If one assumes twelve songs per album, that represents a decline of 
360 million in sales of individual songs.  The increase in digital single sales was 119 
million or almost exactly a third of the loss in individual songs on album formats.45  
That consumers who are free to buy only what they want would choose to buy only 
about a third of what is available on albums is plausible. 
As the portability of music increases, so does demand.  Meanwhile, consumers 
are enjoying more music, not less.  They are not at the mercy of major-label A&R 
personnel and executives to define their tastes.  They get cheaper music.  They can 
buy only the songs they want.  The possibility of carrying hundreds of songs in their 
shirt pockets and listening to them whenever they want is not only more attractive 
than standing in line at the checkout counter to buy CDs selected from a limited 
inventory, it likely increases the overall demand for music because it opens up more 
hours per day during which it can be enjoyed.  
The established industry was slow to satisfy this new demand.46  The 
attractiveness of the new technologies was strong enough that new enterprises 
sprang up to supply the exploding demand for music in .mp3 formats.47  It was not as 
though someone went to a 7-Eleven store where magazines were offered for sale and 
elected to steal one instead.  It is more like a situation in which 7-Eleven refused to 
sell magazines and had made commercial deals with potential importers to prevent 
them from importing, and people wanting to read magazines smuggled them in.  
Smuggling, like copyright infringement, is illegal.48  But copyright infringement in 
the form of unlicensed conversion of music to .mp3 formats and trading in those 
formats exploded only when the established industry tried to block the use of new 
technologies with significant consumer benefits.49 
Since the mid 1990s, of course, it has been possible to buy .mp3 files over the 
Internet and sales have mushroomed.50  People are perfectly willing to buy digital 
music, and only now is the industry beginning to cooperate fully in making music 
available in those formats, while pressuring Steve Jobs to raise prices for iTunes, and 
trying to throw a litigation monkey wrench into the works of the phenomenally 
successful MySpace.51 
                                                                                                                                     
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 See John Tehranian, All Rights Reversed? Reassessing Copyright and Patent Enforcement 
in the Digital Age, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 45, 77–78 (2003). 
47 See Nicola F. Sharpe & Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Is Apple Playing Fair?  Navigating the iPod 
Fairplay DRM Controversy, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 332, 337–38 (2007), http://www.law. 
northwestern.edu/journals/njtip/v5/n2/5/. 
48 17 U.S.C. §§ 501, 506(a) (2006) (copyright infringement); 18 U.S.C. § 545 (2006) (smuggling). 
49 See generally STEVE KNOPPER, APPETITE FOR SELF-DESTRUCTION:  THE SPECTACULAR 
CRASH OF THE RECORD INDUSTRY IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2009) (describing specific instances in which 
established music industry tried to block, rather than adapting to, new ways of making and 
distributing popular music). 
50 See Sharpe & Arewa, supra note 47, at 337–38. 
51 See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., 526 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1053–54 (C.D. Cal. 2007).  
The complaint alleges widespread infringement by MySpace subscribers.   Complaint for Direct, 
Contributory, and Vicarious Copyright Infringement, for Inducement of Copyright Infringement, 
and for Violations of California Business and Professions Code § 17200 ¶¶ 19–20, UMG Recordings, 
Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., 526 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (No. CV 06-07361 AHM (AJWx)). 
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It surely is not immoral for the major labels to try to protect a past technology 
that produces higher margins, nor for the Tower Records of the world to try to protect 
a business that arose to manage transaction costs that are no longer present.  But 
the problem for the labels is a backward looking business philosophy, not an erosion 
of morals in those who want to listen to music in the most convenient way possible. 
The increased competition and the demise of traditional gatekeepers means a 
sharp reduction in prices—approaching zero—for recorded music.  In a competitive 
market, prices approach marginal costs.52  The marginal cost of a copy of an .mp3 file 
is effectively zero.53  That means that prices for recorded music are trending 
inexorably toward zero.  
Copyright is unenforceable and hence essentially irrelevant except at the 
margins of the new order.  Pervasive enforcement of copyright in connection with 
most exchanges of recorded music at the consumer level is impracticable.54  It cannot 
be done without imposing significant new burdens on Internet intermediaries,55 and 
this cannot be done without destroying the core features of the Internet. The 
decentralized and immediate accessibility of MySpace for direct distribution of music 
by musicians would be impossible if MySpace were obligated to pre-screen every 
upload for possible intellectual property (“IP”) infringement. 
The same is true of the web hosting sites on which musicians create their own 
web pages and make them available to the world. 
Law’s role—particularly the role of copyright law—in the music industry has 
declined.  It will continue to decline.  Music copyright has suffered two body blows:  
because of the proliferation of digital copies, it has become less enforceable and, as 
the value of recorded music declines, it is less worthwhile to try to enforce it.56 
Copyright protection for recorded music at the consumer level has become 
essentially unenforceable.57  Digital recording technologies make it possible to 
produce perfect copies of recorded music cheaply and quickly.58  Compression 
algorithms embedded in software known as “codecs” produce relatively small files 
that can be distributed in a few seconds via the Internet.59 
The economic viability of licensed channels for recorded music is more a function 
of lower consumer transaction costs for iTunes—but not for many major-label 
sources—than of respect for intellectual property rights.  
New institutions for managing consumer search costs and musician promotion 
are emerging.   
“Time is money.”  Time also is not unlimited.  350,000 new songs were 
released on CD format in 2006.  If each one takes three minutes to play, and 
the average consumer listens to only one minute before deciding whether he 
                                                                                                                                     
52 See DONALD STEVENSON WATSON & MALCOLM GETZ, PRICE THEORY AND ITS USES 219–29 
(5th ed. 1981) (1963) (deriving short-term equilibrium price).  
53 Sprigman, supra note 38, at 88–89. 
54 See Robert J. Delchin, Musical Copyright Law:  Past, Present and Future of Online Music 
Distribution, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 343, 395 (2004). 
55 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (2006). 
56 See Schultz, supra note 39, at 689.  
57 See Delchin, supra note 54, at 350. 
58 Id. at 350–51. 
59 See id. at 350–52. 
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likes it, it would require 350,000 minutes, or about 6,000 hours to sample 
all of them.  That is 250 days per year, without allowing any time for sleep.  
No one is that compulsive about music[—let alone] the physiological 
problems of sleep deprivation.  [Furthermore,] that does not allow for the 
other new songs created each year that never get released on CDs by major 
record labels[, which] surely number in the tens of millions.  So consumers 
need some way to reduce search costs.60 
Under the old model, the labels reduced search costs by selecting only a small 
fraction of available music to produce, promote, distribute, and sell, leaving 
musicians without a major record label deal mostly out of the marketplace.  Radio 
stations exposed potential consumers to new music, almost all of it sold by the major 
labels.61  Press and media coverage was focused primarily on artists with major 
record label deals.62 
The most interesting question about the evolution of the new marketplace, 
considered in the next section, is the shape new kinds of intermediaries will take as 
they meet the needs of consumers to manage search costs, and the needs of musicians 
to make consumers aware of their music.63 
II.  WHAT TO EXPECT IN THE FUTURE 
The future of popular music will be determined by the same motivations and 
patterns of behavior that have defined the music marketplace of the past.  Artists 
and consumers will continue to behave pretty much as they have in the past.64  What 
will be dramatically different is that they will have different tools. 
Most consumers, though interested in discovering new music, will remain 
relatively passive.  Few will aggressively browse the Web to discover new musicians.  
Musicians will still have to push their message and their songs to consumers; just 
putting a new song or album on the Web will not be enough to attract fans.65  New 
intermediaries must help consumers manage search costs and help artists push their 
music to consumers.  “Push,” of course, reduces search costs; a consumer need not go 
out seeking music; he gets it put in his earbuds.  
                                                                                                                                     
60 Perritt, Jr., supra note 20, at 313–14.  
61 See Ankur Srivastava, The Anti-Competitive Music Industry and the Case for Compulsory 
Licensing in the Digital Distribution of Music, 22 TOURO L. REV. 375, 395–97, 399 (2006).  
62 See id. at 394–95. 
63 See Jon Pareles, 2006, Brought To You By You, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2006, § 2, at 1 
(reporting that the Internet has become an “incessant public audition,” diluting the winnowing down 
once performed by record label A & R departments, but multiplying choices “promise ever more 
diversity, ever more possibility for innovation and unexpected delight”). 
64 See RICHARD E. CAVES, CREATIVE INDUSTRIES:  CONTRACTS BETWEEN ART AND COMMERCE 
2–10 (Harvard Univ. Press 2000) (summarizing characteristics of creators and consumers).  The 
Caves book presents a probing analysis by a distinguished Harvard economist of the peculiar 
characteristics of markets for music, theater, film, and visual art.  Id.   
65 Some surfing occurs, however, for example, indie musician Dick Prall got a Volkwagen car-
show deal for several of his songs because the advertising agency surfed MySpace and liked the 
music he posted there for downloading.  See Dick Prall Biography, ARTISTDIRECT MUSIC, http:// 
www.artistdirect.com/artist/bio/dick-prall/1111496 (last visited May 26, 2010). 
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Mere awareness by consumers often is not enough.66  What musicians also need 
is some way to build attachment by fans—a sense of affiliation between a performer 
and fans.  Fan clubs have been a feature of the entertainment industry for a long 
time.  New applications by intermediaries such as MySpace “friends” make it easier 
to build attachment—though being displayed as a “friend” of Oucho Sparks67 is not 
like Dick Prall68 putting his arm around you after a concert and autographing his CD 
while smiling and looking you in the eye. 
iTunes and imitators will dominate and their availability will increase demand.  
Industry statistics cited earlier in this paper show that sales of digital formats over 
the Internet are accelerating as CD sales decline.69  Consumers are shifting their 
purchases from CDs to downloadable and portable formats, while overall demand is 
increasing.70 
The portability of music in digital formats contained on shirt-pocket-sized 
players increases the number of hours in each consumer’s day when he or she can 
listen to music.  The ease of purchase and downloading formats directly into portable 
players from retail sites like iTunes and from artists’ websites reduces the 
inconvenience of buying new music.  The result will be a significant increase in the 
demand for music. 
While firm data is not yet available to substantiate this prediction, the explosive 
upsurge in purchases of music from iTunes reinforces the prediction.  Even as prices 
fall because of lower costs for promotion and distribution, the increased demand will 
enlarge the total revenue stream available for musicians. 
Major labels will decline.  The market share for major labels will continue to 
decline.  Music intermediaries historically have (a) assembled capital for investment 
in new music production, provided (b) production, (c) publication, and (d) distribution 
functions, (e) promoted new music to make consumers aware of it, and (f) “filtered” 
new music to reduce consumer search costs.71 
Major labels represent an institutional structure designed for the past—a past 
in which the most important forms of intermediation were artist-selection to reduce 
consumer search costs, advertising, promotion and distribution of physical formats.  
Their enterprises are structured to reflect the economies of scale of CD manufacture, 
promotion of radio play by staffs of agents, and advertising in major publications.  
Few enterprises are able to resist the desire to protect short-term revenue 
streams to support existing infrastructure and bureaucracy.  The major labels will 
                                                                                                                                     
66 See Jenny Eliscu et al., Indie Rock Around the Clock, ROLLING STONE, Nov. 30, 2006, at 34 
(“It’s kind of absurd how many bands are [at the October 2006 CMJ Music Marathon].” (quoting 
Ryan Frederiksen, guitarist, These Arms Are Snakes)). 
67 Oucho Sparks is an indie rock group in Chicago.  See Oucho Sparks on MySpace Music – 
Free Streaming MP3s, Pictures & Music Downloads, MYSPACE.COM, www.myspace.com/ 
ouchosparks (last visited May 26, 2010).   
68 Dick Prall is an indie singer-songwriter in Chicago.  See Dick Prall on MySpace Music – Free 
Streaming MP3s, Pictures & Music Downloads, MYSPACE.COM, www.myspace.com/dickprall (last 
visited May 26, 2010).   
69 RIAA 2008, supra note 21; RIAA 2007, supra note 23. 
70 See RIAA 2008, supra note 21; RIAA 2007, supra note 23. 
71 See Thomas F. Cotter, Some Observations on the Law and Economics of Intermediaries, 
2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 67, 69–70, 75–77 (2006) (identifying historic functions; music intermediaries 
still needed to perform filtering function, even if other functions have been overtaken by technology 
which permits them to be performed in other, cheaper ways).  
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continue to divert resources into suing users of the new technologies; they will seek 
price increases for digital formats, and only grudgingly make their catalogs available 
to new distribution channels, encumbering them with digital rights management 
(“DRM”).72 
Meanwhile, more artists will bypass the major labels, choosing to reach 
consumers directly or through new firms that have grown up around the new 
technologies. 
CDs are dead and radio may be next.  Few reasons exist to motivate a rational 
consumer of music to buy a CD from a brick-and-mortar retailer instead of 
downloading music from iTunes or from artist websites.  CDs are inconvenient to 
buy; they require additional steps to transform the music contained on them into 
formats that can be played on portable music players.  Additionally, the graphics, 
lyrics, and other text until recently available only on CD liners now are available for 
downloading and presentation on music players with video capability.73 
As will any market transition driven by technology change, the transition in 
music formats will be incremental and the demand for CDs will never disappear 
altogether.  Some consumers still prefer vinyl records and a few specialty shops still 
carry them.  Nevertheless, within three to five years, CDs will be as much an artifact 
of the past as vinyl records and cassette tapes. 
Music radio (including music played on general-programming stations) was a 
step toward portability of music consumption, now largely eclipsed by the greater 
ease and control of playing music on portable players.  Music radio also helps to 
reduce search costs, helping consumers to discover new music.  Radio will continue to 
have some role; it requires no intervention by consumers except to turn the radio 
receiver on and select the station.  Some consumers some of the time will prefer the 
nearly complete passivity of listening that radio permits; even an iPod requires some 
greater effort to select particular songs, artists, or playlists.  Also, some new music 
will continue to be discovered by consumers listening to the radio.74  
A significant shift already is occurring, not only from listening to music on 
portable players instead of on the radio, but also from discovering new music through 
Web browsing instead of by listening to the radio.  The existence of the shift is 
manifested by reduced interest by investors in owning music-oriented radio stations 
and the trend toward divestiture of radio stations by those already owning them.75 
As labels retreat and contract they will provide even fewer opportunities for 
musicians.  As the conglomerates that own major record labels retrench in the face of 
declining demand for the music formats in which they specialize and the means of 
intermediation they represent, less capital will be available to finance their approach 
                                                                                                                                     
72 Cf. Pareles, supra note 63 (stating that the music industry will have to “remake itself with 
lower and more sustainable expectations along the lines of how independent labels already work”). 
73 Brian Garrity, Pay Now, Download Later, BILLBOARD (Aug. 7, 2005), http://www.allbusiness. 
com/retail-trade/miscellaneous-retail-retail-stores-not/4556368-1.html.  
74 See Jesse Fox Mayshark, One Way to Get RadioPlay:  Do It Yourself, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 
2006, § 2, at 30 (noting that satellite radio’s programming of slots for well-known musicians broaden 
opportunities for radio play; offering a middle ground between the Internet, “where it is hard to get 
attention, and narrowly programmed terrestrial radio, where it is hard to get airplay,” and 
marketing-survey driven radio stations are playing fewer and fewer songs). 
75 See Andrew Ross Sorkin, U.S. Radio Company May Sell For $18 Billion, INT’L HERALD TRIB., 
Nov. 14, 2006, at 12. 
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to new music ventures.  The labels will become more selective, concentrating their 
capital and attention on those musicians most likely to produce blockbuster songs 
and albums in the short run.  Emphasis will shift away from new musicians toward 
those who already have a substantial following—established singers and bands and 
new faces who have become stars through television programs such as American Idol, 
or who have made a name for themselves as actors or athletes. 
This will reduce opportunities for breaking through.  As the major labels direct 
their attention away from new musicians, the opportunities for breaking through into 
the big leagues by signing a record deal will diminish.  Independent musicians will 
recognize this and shift their energies in other directions to make a living off of their 
music.  In other words, Chris Anderson’s “long tail” may predominate.   
The Long Tail equation is simple:  1) The lower the cost of distribution, the 
more you can economically offer without having to predict demand.  2) The 
more you can offer, the greater the chance that you will be able to tap latent 
demand for minority tastes that was unreachable through traditional retail.  
3) [A]ggregate enough minority taste, and you'll often find get a big new 
market.76   
Anderson points to an experiment by Universal Music to offer out-of-print songs 
through download only as validating his hypothesis.77 
That will squeeze out those who get rich by becoming rock stars, while opening 
up opportunities for many more indie musicians to make a living off of their music.78 
More opportunities exist for independent artists and amateurs.  The unbundling 
of songs from the album format, while reducing revenue for major labels, also opens 
up some new possibilities for musicians:  no longer must they wait until they have 
ten to fifteen songs ready to release in an album format; now they can release songs 
individually as they are completed.79  For musicians, this represents, among other 
things, a reduction in the “lumpiness” of capital:  they no longer need to have enough 
money to carry on until they complete a dozen songs; now they can recover capital 
costs on a song-by-song basis.  They also can keep their names more consistently in 
the public mind, without having to mobilize larger scale promotional campaigns for 
albums once every couple of years.  E-commerce makes it possible for indie 
musicians, as well as for large firms to tap revenue streams resulting from “merch” 
sales.80  Part V explores new business models for musicians. 
                                                                                                                                     
76 Posting of Chris Anderson to The Long Tail, WIRED BLOG NETWORK (Oct. 19, 2006, 08:34 
AM), http://www.longtail.com/the_long_tail/2006/10/universals_long.html.  
77 Online Music Fans Respond Strongly to Universal Music’s Deep Catalogue Initiative, 
UNIVERSAL MUSIC GROUP (Oct. 17, 2006), http://new.umusic.com/News.aspx?NewsId=432 (reporting 
on sales of 250,000 tracks of otherwise unavailable European recordings in first six months of 2006); 
see WILLIAM DAVIES & KAY WITHERS, PUBLIC INNOVATION:  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN A DIGITAL 
AGE 28–29 (2006) (predicting that music industry will shift toward long-tail phenomenon). 
78 See Eliscu et al., supra note 66, at 34 (asserting that major labels lost market share in 2005, 
while indie musicians’ collective market share increased). 
79 See Jeff Leeds, Squeezing Money From the Music, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2006, at C1 (“[S]ales 
of downloaded individual songs are eroding the underpinnings of the CD and remixing the 
industry's economics.”). 
80 See id. (reporting that “new definition” of a hit is a song or album that racks up less than 
500,000 in sales but with several revenue streams, including record sales, music publishing, concert 
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New intermediaries will reduce market failure better than old ones.  As major 
record labels intensify their efforts to protect the past, space will open up for new 
enterprises to use the new Internet-based technologies to perform search and sales 
functions in a reconfigured market.81  Apple’s iTunes is the most dramatic example of 
rapid success in this regard.  The music labels did not embrace the opportunity to sell 
music at reasonable prices over the Internet, so computer-company Apple stepped 
into the breach.  But this will not be the only example.  CD Baby82 makes it easy for 
musicians to sell CDs and downloadable formats to consumers with low transaction 
and monetary costs for both.83  CD Baby facilitates musician access to larger-scale 
Internet intermediaries such as amazon.com and iTunes.84  Not all succeed, of course, 
even if they offer apparently attractive services.  Snocap,85 for example, sought to 
establish relationships with musicians and with sellers, building a large catalog of 
music from throughout the spectrum of creators, ranging from unknown indie 
musicians to major-label stars and to deploying a technology t make it easy for artists 
to specify and sellers to apply terms of sale that reflect artist preferences on price 
and license terms—whether consumers are allowed to share purchased music, for 
example.86 
MySpace, which has blossomed as a marketplace where indie musicians can 
show off their music and build networks of collaborators and fans, now makes it 
possible for musicians to sell their music as well on their MySpace sites.87  The 
acquisition of YouTube by Google portends the same with respect to music videos.88 
New technologies allow consumers to find music they have not encountered but 
may like, through “you-might-like-this” features on amazon.com and iTunes, and 
through new services such as Pandora,89 which allow consumers to specify a song 
they like and receive recommendations of other songs that have similar melodic, 
harmonic, and rhythmic structures.90 
                                                                                                                                     
ticket sales, and “merch” sales).  “Merch” refers to collateral goods such as tee-shirts and posters 
containing musician images or logos.  Id.  
81 See Leeds, CD Sales Falling, supra note 41 (providing an example of “protecting the past” 
through Apple’s efforts in conjunction with labels, to encourage users through the use of “credits” to 
purchase entire albums through iTunes rather than just individual songs). 
82 About CD Baby, CD BABY, http://www.cdbaby.com/About (last visited May 28, 2010). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Snocap was acquired by imeem in April 2008, which was in turn acquired by MySpace in 
December 2009, at which time the Snocap service was discontinued.  Imeem Acquires Snocap, 
BILLBOARD.BIZ, http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/content_display/industry/e3i5c05b6a8dfbf0a334d1c 
82127be312a5; see Brian Stelter, MySpace to Showcase Music and Sell Performance Videos, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2007, at C5 (explaining that Snocap was part of MySpace and permitted bands to sell 
their music on personal profile pages). 
86 See Stelter, supra note 85. 
87 See Jeff Leeds & Brad Stone, Three Record Companies Team Up With MySpace for Music 
Web Site, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2008, at C1 (introducing a subscription based plan for  music 
distribution on MySpace which was initially a site for playlist sharing and streaming music free of 
charge). 
88 Press Release, Google Press Center, Google to Acquire YouTube for $1.65 Billion in Stock:  
Combination Will Create New Opportunities for Users and Content Owners Everywhere (Oct. 9, 
2006), http://www.google.com/press/pressrel/google_youtube.html. 
89 About Pandora®, PANDORA, http://www.pandora.com/corporate (last visited May 28, 2010). 
90 See Anastasia Ustinova, Music to Go:  Pandora Works with Apple to Provide Tunes on the 
iPhone at No Charge, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., July 11, 2008, at C1. 
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Technology can match consumer tastes and musician product, thereby reducing 
the costs of intermediation and increasing the range of plausible business models.   
Any such technology must confront major challenges, however.  Consumers are 
inarticulate about what they like, except by naming bands they already like.  
Musicians are inarticulate about what they offer, even by naming “sounds like” 
bands as on Snocap or MySpace entries.  The heart of this problem is the absence of 
any consensual taxonomy of music characteristics—even among academics and 
commercial researchers.  It is unlikely that a comprehensive and rigorous taxonomy 
can be developed because of the holistic and visceral determinants of music 
enjoyment. 
It is too early to predict the extent to which automated analysis can play a major 
role in music intermediation, but some promising approaches can be identified, one 
based on statistical classification of music, the other based on open-source software.  
All of this represents new intermediation channels between musicians and 
music consumers and new ways to reduce search costs for consumers. 
New business models will arise to replace models premised on revenue from 
recorded music.  It is possible to make money while giving away recorded music.91  
Consumers are willing to pay for convenience and for services that help them find 
new music that they like.  As new intermediaries arise to match musicians with 
potential fans, they will crystallize business models based on fees for premium 
services (Pandora is a current example) and advertising.92  They will share a portion 
of this revenue stream with musicians. 
Piracy will continue but diminish in importance because pirates can’t compete 
with free either, and their music is not free.  Consumers are shifting their acquisition 
of music from CDs to a combination of licensed purchases of downloadable and 
portable formats and illicit sources—commercial pirates and peers.93  No doubt the 
market share of illicit sources is higher than it was before downloadable formats 
were available.  
Nevertheless, piracy is becoming less, not more, of a problem because some 
“pirates” are volunteer promoters, and real pirates “cannot compete with free.”  The 
major labels are concerned about three kinds of piracy—although they routinely 
lump them together:  (1) free file sharing among friends through informal networks, 
(2) sales of unauthorized copies of music, and (3) large scale free file sharing through 
organized networks such as Grokster.94   
All three cases, the major labels say, represent a threat because, as many people 
put it, “you can’t compete with free.”  (Tell that to sellers of bottled water and cable 
television.)  The attractiveness of unauthorized copies of music is driven in part by 
the price of the copies, compared with the price of authorized copies.  But it also is 
driven by the relative convenience of each, by loyalty to the performers, by fear of 
                                                                                                                                     
91 See CHRIS ANDERSON, FREE:  THE FUTURE OF A RADICAL PRICE 13–14 (2009) (offering 
examples of industries that have operating profitable business models based on giving away 
products and services). 
92 See, e.g., Pandora FAQ, How do I Pay for Unlimited Monthly Listening Hours?, PANDORA, 
http://blog.pandora.com/faq/contents/1494.html (last visited May 28, 2010). 
93 See Ram D. Gopal et al., Do Artists Benefit from Online Music Sharing?, 79 J. BUS. 1503, 
1510 (“After downloading a song, a consumer faces three subsequent choices:  buy a legitimate 
version of the song, keep the illegal copy (this constitutes piracy), or discard the downloaded song.”). 
94 See Piracy:  Online and on the Street, supra note 6. 
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getting corrupted files and other harmful computer code, and by the fear of legal 
liability.  
“Theft” in the first form of file sharing has never been a threat to music creation 
because it helps artists neglected by the major labels make consumers aware of their 
music.  In the case of informal file sharing, preference for the unauthorized copy is 
usually driven by mere convenience.  One’s friend hands him a CD or sends an .mp3 
file, saying, “Hey, I think you’ll like this,” and one tries the music.  
“Theft” in the second form provides the least social benefit; the pirate is simply 
seeking to make money off investment by the rightsholders.  “Theft” in the third form 
has debatable effects:  it provides greater exposure to otherwise unknown musicians, 
but it also undoubtedly undercuts sales by the rightsholders.  
The wide availability of music for sale on services like iTunes and the increasing 
availability of full-length songs and albums on musician websites and on networks 
like MySpace is shifting demand away from large-scale illicit channels, even those 
that appear to offer music for free.95  Choosing among substitutes responds to what 
economists call “cross elasticity of demand.”96  What matters in cross elasticity of 
demand is relative price, not absolute price.97  So as the price for music from 
legitimate sources falls, economic theory says that less of the total demand will be 
satisfied by unauthorized sources.98 
Moreover, music through large-scale file-sharing networks is not really “free.”  
Any Internet network of strangers will be beset with spam, viruses, and phishing.  
Everyone’s e-mail box tells him that.  Music consumers can reduce their exposure to 
such annoyances by dealing primarily with people they know or with legitimate 
commercial channels, whether they be iTunes, a specific musician’s website, 
MySpace, or YouTube. 
File sharing reduces search costs and increases exposure of musicians to 
potential fans.  Certain forms of file sharing increase the exposure of heretofore 
unknown musicians and increase the likelihood that consumers will buy their music.  
Several breakthrough bands such as Coldplay, Arctic Monkeys99 and My Chemical 
Romance gained attention by giving away CDs for free and posting free downloads on 
their websites.  Most music consumers have had the experience of being exposed for 
the first time to a band or a singer because one of their friends gave them a CD or 
emailed them an .mp3 file.  Most of them responded to music they like by going to 
iTunes or a musician’s website to download more of that performer’s music. 
DRM gets in the way of robust evolution of the new market.  Many sellers of 
music naturally want to build walls around their music to prevent free-riding and 
other forms of competition.  New technologies make it possible to build new kinds of 
                                                                                                                                     
95 See Deborah Tussey, Music at the Edge of Chaos:  A Complex Systems Perspective on File 
Sharing, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 147, 204 (2005). 
96 THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 91, 414 (David W. Pearce & Robert Shaw eds., 
4th ed.). 
97 Id. at 91. 
98 See id.  
99 See DAVIES & WITHERS, supra note 77, at 43–44 (reporting on Arctic Monkeys’ rapid rise to 
the top of the charts as a result of their making their music available for free through MySpace). 
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walls.100  Apple makes it difficult for iTunes purchases to be played on anything other 
than an Apple iPod.  Rhapsody and other music subscription services encode their 
music to prevent playing when subscriptions lapse.101  Many proposals for reform of 
the music marketplace emphasize new digital rights management schemes through 
code embedded in digital music recordings.102 
All of these schemes increase transaction costs for both musicians and 
consumers.  Few DRM systems work perfectly and almost all leave consumers 
vulnerable to the experience of having bought something but not being able to enjoy 
what they have bought.  For example, songs paid for and downloaded from iTunes 
mysteriously disappear from music libraries on consumer computers.  Creators of 
music are confronted with annoying and burdensome queries about registration 
when they try to upload their own music into music libraries in iTunes and Microsoft 
Media Player.  New DRM schemes interfere with management of music files by their 
own creators and rights owners.103 
Creators and other suppliers of music should be steadfast in their efforts to 
reduce transaction costs confronted by consumers who want to purchase music from 
legitimate sources rather than to acquire it from unlicensed file sharing sources.  
DRM is inconsistent with this objective and will drive a greater proportion of 
consumers back to illicit file sharing networks.104 
III.  THE LAW SHOULD NOT BE A COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY FORCE 
The law can make three contributions to accommodate the development of this 
new marketplace:  first, it can make it clear that certain types of file sharing are 
privileged; second, it can avoid embrace of DRM; third, it can strengthen the 
copyright registration system so as to facilitate obtaining copyright permissions. 
Legislatures and judges should resist entreaties to broaden the scope of IP 
protection.  Major labels manage portfolios of intellectual property in music.   
Security of the IP is an important feature giving the portfolio value.  The portfolio 
plays a role in financing new ventures because the IP can be pledged as security for 
loans.105  This interrelationship between IP and finance is essential for capital-
intensive projects, such as the launch of a new album under traditional conditions.106   
As upfront costs go down, however, the portfolio of IP becomes less important 
                                                                                                                                     
100 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 122 (Basic Books 1999) 
(arguing that use restrictions implemented by computer programs and copy protection inhibit 
consumers more than traditional law). 
101 See Rhapsody Free Trial - Pricing and Plans, RHAPSODY, http://www.rhapsody.com/-
discover/plans (last visited May 28, 2010). 
102 See, e.g., Randal C. Picker, Mistrust-Based Digital Rights Management, 5 J. TELECOMM. & 
HIGH TECH. L. 47, 69 (2006).  
103 David Pogue, Trying Out the Zune:  iPod It’s Not, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006, at C1 (“What’s 
really nuts is that the restrictions even stomp on your own musical creations,” reporting on DRM in 
Microsoft’s Zune music player). 
104 See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Flanking the DRM Maginot Line Against New Music Markets, 16 
MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 113, 144 (2007). 
105 See Sidney S. Goldstein, Non-Traditional Sources—Intellectual Property as Collateral, in 1 
ADVISING SMALL BUS. § 12:6.20 (Steven C. Alberty ed., 2009). 
106 DAVIES & WITHERS, supra note 77, at 37.  
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because less capital needs to be raised.107  Accordingly, industry proposals for 
expanded IP protection for popular music should be viewed with skepticism as a 
matter of policy, and scrutinized for consistency with the power granted by the 
Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution.108 
Copyright law should privilege file sharing.  File sharing can help sell music or 
it can undercut sales depending on the nature of file sharing.  Small-scale gratuitous 
file sharing reinforces word of mouth and increases demand for previously unknown 
music.109  Large-scale, fee-based, file sharing competes with authorized sellers for 
consumers.  
This distinction should be accommodated by copyright law.  A straightforward 
way to do this is to amend the Copyright Act by adding the following paragraph after 
¶ (11) of 17 U.S.C. § 110: 
(12) making and transferring a copy of a nondramatic musical work or 
sound recording, otherwise than sale  to the public, without any purpose of 
direct or indirect commercial advantage and without payment of any fee or 
other compensation for the copy, if- 
(A) there is no direct or indirect charge for the copy; and 
(B) the transferor and transferee have a previous family, personal or social 
relationship. 
One asserting this privilege shall have the burden of proving the existence of the 
prior relationship. 
This would make it clear, statutorily, that informal music file sharing among 
friends cannot give rise to liability for infringement. 
Existing law also could privilege the same type of behavior the proposed 
amendment to section 110 covers, under the fair-use privilege recognized in section 
107.  The problem is that the recent case law applying section 107 in the file-sharing 
context is adverse.110  In A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., for example, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected arguments that file sharing 
was privileged fair use because it was used to sample music for possible purchase 
and because it was not commercial in character.111  
                                                                                                                                     
107 See id. (stating that the need for intellectual property protection is proportional to need for 
upfront capital). 
108 Compare United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 429–30 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(dismissing indictment; “anti-bootlegging statute,” 18 U.S.C. § 2319A, is unconstitutional because it 
provides perpetual protection for non-fixed performances, thus violating both the “limited times” and 
the “writings” limitations of Copyright Clause) with Kiss Catalog, Ltd. v. Passport Int’l Prods., Inc., 
405 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1171, 1173 n.9, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (granting motion for reconsideration on 
petition by United States; 18 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) is constitutional under Commerce Clause; no need 
to consider limitations of Copyright Clause). 
109 Gopal et al., supra note 93, at 1507. 
110 See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1028 (9th Cir. 2001). 
111 Id. at 1014–15 (stating that commercial use under fair-use framework exists when repeated 
and exploitative unauthorized copies are made to save expense of purchasing authorized copies); see 
also Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769, 779 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Napster 
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Avoid embrace of DRM.  Probably the greatest danger to the new market 
architecture is that a “compromise” such as that proposed by several commentators, 
including Fisher,112 and Litman,113 would be enacted.  This compromise would define 
a technological framework for digital music sales and use through sophisticated DRM 
technologies, in exchange for a tax on blank media and, perhaps, a tax on portable 
music players.114  This would be a pernicious approach.  The tax is not the problem, 
unless it were so great to increase the price of blank media or portable players, by 
more than, say, ten percent.  The problem is the DRM.  As noted supra, DRM gets in 
the way of desirable developments because it negates some of the advantages of the 
new formats and channels for distribution.  There is nothing wrong with allowing 
suppliers, intermediaries and consumers who want to use DRM to use it.  The 
problem is the likelihood that legislatively sanctioned use of DRM would tend to 
exclude entry-level musicians who do not have deals with major labels or other large 
intermediaries.  The marketplace of the future should be one which accommodates 
and encourages the kind of competitive landscape now beginning to be visible with 
MySpace and the flourishing of artist websites offering music for sale—usually in the 
form of simple .mp3 files.  DRM is not part of this landscape and it should not be 
imposed upon it.115 
A new Internet-accessible music-rights registration system is needed.  The 
Coase Theorem postulates that individuals will negotiate socially optimal bargains in 
the absence of law, but only if transaction costs are zero.116  The assumption that 
copyrighted music will be licensed on market-appropriate terms assumes zero 
transaction costs.117  Transaction costs are far from zero; no central database of 
copyrighted musical works exists, because there is no registration requirement;118 
and penetrating the opaque bureaucracies of rights holders requires the patience of 
Job. 
The present copyright system impedes obtaining permission when a music 
creator wants to base his creation on material that is subject to copyright.  The 
Copyright Office is slow to update the Internet-available system for searching 
copyright registration.119  Music copyright holders are not required to register their 
copyrights or to deposit their works as a condition of copyright, and international law 
                                                                                                                                     
Ninth Circuit opinion for proposition that repeated copying of copyrighted works is not fair use even 
if copies are not offered for sale). 
112 WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP:  TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF 
ENTERTAINMENT 313 (2004). 
113 Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 31, 33 (2004). 
114 Id.; FISHER III, supra note 112, at 313. 
115 See Perritt, Jr., supra note 20, at 316.   
116 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 7 (1960). 
117 See id. 
118 UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION FOR SOUND RECORDINGS, 
CIRC. 56.0509, at 1 (2009) (stating that no requirement exists for publication or registration to gain 
copyright protection, but rather that the protection is automatic under current copyright laws). 
119 See Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request:  Hearing Before the Comm. on Appropriations, 111th 
Cong., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE (Apr. 19, 2009), http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat042909.html 
(statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights). 
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prohibits the United States from imposing such formalities as a requisite for a 
copyright coming into existence.120 
As long as copyright law exposes creators of music to liability if they use 
material copyrighted by another in their own creations, the law also should facilitate 
their obtaining permission from the copyright holder, in exchange for whatever fee 
the copyright holder wants to charge—possibly subject to arbitration if the 
negotiations reach an impasse. 
Incentives can be created for registration and deposit, by privileging 
development of derivative works unless the underlying material has been deposited 
and registered and unless the copyright holder agrees to submit to interest 
arbitration in the absence of agreement over the price of a license. 
The law should let the new market evolve.  The problem with this, if any, 
straightforward proposal for reform is that it is unlikely to be considered seriously by 
Congress,121 and if Congress were to take it up, the resulting legislation probably 
would extend the scope of existing copyright without doing anything to privilege file 
sharing or otherwise promote the transition to the new marketplace. 
The degree of capture of Congress by the established players in the industry 
makes it hazardous to attempt to move copyright reform through the Congress.122 
It likely is better simply to leave the statute alone.  Technology eventually will 
prevail against the efforts by the major labels to use the law to thwart the new 
competition.  Aggressive litigation by the labels will provide a desirable disincentive 
for large-scale commercial piracy, but it can never reach all of the smaller scale file 
sharing that will continue, promoting exposure for new musicians.123 
IV.  NEW BUSINESS MODELS WILL EMERGE 
“But if we cannot broaden the scope of IP protection and use DRM to limit what 
consumers may do with the music,” the industry advocates ask, “how are we to make 
money?”  The more relevant question is not how Sony or Time Warner make money, 
but how can society assure that musicians keep making music and making it 
available to consumers?  Both questions implicate business models for popular music. 
The viability of any business model depends on the structure of the relevant 
market.  As this article explains, the market structure for popular music will be one 
in which demand is increasing because of greater portability and the number of 
suppliers is increasing because of lower barriers to entry.  If new levels of demand 
                                                                                                                                     
120 See Lawrence Lessig, Creative Economies, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 33, 38–39 (2006) 
(explaining why it is prohibitively expensive to obtain permissions). 
121 Id. at 40 (stating that the likelihood of appropriate Congressional response is “zero”; “a kind 
of IP McCarthyism reigns” over Washington debate). 
122 See Performance Rights Act:  Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 26 
(2009) (“[T]o be successful in any amendment to intellectual property law, you had to get all of the 
players at the table and at least all of the players not being opposed to the product of 
negotiation . . . .”). 
123 See Amy Harmon & John Schwartz, Despite Suits, Music File Sharers Shrug Off Guilt and 
Keep Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2003, at A1 (“[M]any file swappers said they were more wary of 
copying music since the wave of [record industry] lawsuits . . . . But there was a strong current of 
defiance, even among those who said they had stopped.”). 
[9:831 2010] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law 850
 
  
exceed new levels of supply, there will be more revenue to go around, if prices remain 
constant.124  But prices will not remain constant; they are falling and will continue to 
fall, as competition increases and new technological channels beyond the control of 
suppliers proliferate.125  The combined effect of demand, supply, and price trends is 
almost certain to reduce the total revenue available to each musician. 
Unknown musicians will struggle in two ways in their efforts to achieve 
economic sustainability.  They will struggle to get someone to notice them—to begin 
to build a fan base—and they will compete for their own share of revenue available 
for sales of recorded songs and for live performances.  Major labels will take on fewer 
new artists and will be less generous in funding new-artist development.  New 
intermediaries will continue to develop to facilitate artists making contact with 
potential fans and to struggle to capture a tolerable level of revenue. 
New sources of capital likely will emerge to replace diminishing capital available 
from the shrinking major labels.  Some investors may be motivated by the excitement 
of being close to the entertainers they fund.  But at least some investors will not 
invest unless they have some plausible expectation of an adequate rate of return.  
One possible approach is to channel modest levels of investment through new 
intermediaries specializing in new music ventures.  With plausible assumptions 
about frequency of performances, download, and merch sales, and advertising 
revenue a four-year investment of $50,000 could produce an annual return on 
investment (“ROI”) of twenty percent.126 
The new intermediaries will have skills and creative imagination that enable 
them to tap new sources of revenue, to make money, and to attract investors who will 
make money too.  Through these new intermediaries, a handful of musicians will 
achieve celebrity status based on their presentation of interest personal and band 
personas.  Consumers will be enthralled by their celebrity and identify with them.  
Investors will cash out through public offerings and corporate acquisitions in which 
the relevant intellectual property is trademark rather than copyright. 
It is unlikely that musicians themselves can deploy the new business models.  
It’s hard for one person to know enough about the logistics of live concerts and 
touring, making productive use of studio time, merchandising of merch, designing 
and propagating a resonant image, in addition to being talented in creating 
appealing music.  This means that, if indie musicians are to be effective in the new 
                                                                                                                                     
124 JULIE HOLLAND MORTIMER & ALAN SORENSEN, SUPPLY RESPONSES TO DIGITAL 
DISTRIBUTION:  RECORDED MUSIC AND LIVE PERFORMANCES 10–12 (2005). 
125 But see id. at 11 (“[A]lbum prices were remarkably unresponsive to the diffusion of file-
sharing technologies starting in 1999.  Prices changed only slightly between 1999-2003 (and in fact 
they increased) and only in 2004 did prices begin to decline.”). 
126 Suppose a private investment fund invests $50,000 in each band, with the revenue to be 
shared 50-50 between the fund and the band.  The fund would control twenty-five percent of the 
total investment and use it for promoting the band, and it would be allowed twenty-five percent to 
cover its overhead.  The band would use the remainder to cover its costs of recording, mixing, 
mastering, CD duplication, travel and street teams.  The term of the deal would be four years.  
Assuming the band performs twice per week, gets an average of $200 per performance, sells ten CDs 
at eight dollars and five tee shirts at ten dollars at each gig, sells another 500 CDs per year at the 
same price, and 200 downloads at one dollar each, total revenue generated over the term would be 
just under $160,000.  This would produce an annual rate of return of nearly twenty percent for the 
fund, and just under $80,000 income for the band.  Some hedge-fund bands would do much better, 
and some would fail altogether. 
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marketplace, they need two things.  They need education and training in the 
activities they are not already skilled at.127  They also need intermediaries,128 
because the finer granularity of the activities inflate transaction costs relative to the 
substantive costs and benefits.  
Considering the costs, including the opportunity costs, of extensive touring, most 
musicians will not be able to tour more than a few weeks a year unless they can 
attract outside investors.  The new intermediaries will channel investment to them. 
Celebrity endorsement is a mainstay of modern mass advertising.129  Once 
musicians attain celebrity status, this revenue stream is easily available and 
celebrities can command a high price.130  Even unknown performers, however, often 
can make more money modeling than performing.131  An entrepreneurial musician 
can diversify by constructing an image or persona that is interesting not only to 
consumers of his music but also to advertising agencies and advertisers.  A unique 
persona has power to move consumers of a variety of products.  Physical 
attractiveness plays a major role in this, but other factors do, as well.  Fall Out Boy 
and Vampire Weekend recognized this.  The former cultivated a bad-boy image;132 
the latter cultivated an educated, preppie image.133 
The rapid growth of behaviorally targeted advertising, which permits 
advertising intermediaries to place ads based on detailed data about the purchasing 
and shopping behavior of individual consumers opens new possibilities for musicians, 
both as advertisers and as hosts for others’ advertisements.  One commentator 
expresses fear that, as licensees associated with advertising replace record label A&R 
executives, the tendency will be to back away from music for its own sake and to 
replace it with music that is not too distracting as background for an 
advertisement.134  On the other hand, licensees can “be [good] talent scouts,” offering 
an alternative channel to radio play to build an audience.135  Indeed advertisers may 
turn out to be more embracing of offbeat and creative music as they seek to give their 
ads impact, compared with radio chain executives who seek only mainstream music 
                                                                                                                                     
127 Musicians at Work Forum:  Stand Out in a Digital World, CHICAGO MUSIC COMMISSION, at 
14:30 (Nov. 16, 2009), http://www.chicago-music.org/stand-out-in-a-digital-world/. 
128 See CAVES, supra note 64, at 297. 
129 Jagdish Agrawal & Wagner A. Kamakura, The Economic Worth of Celebrity Endorsers:  An 
Event Study Analysis, 59 J. MARKETING 56, 56 (1995). 
130 See id. (noting that Celebrity endorsements can cost millions of dollars if contracted over 
several years, and may also include profit sharing).   
131 Interview with Brian Kennedy, Actor, Chicago, Ill. (Nov. 7, 2008) (reporting ready 
availability of modeling opportunities paying $500 per appearance, contrasted with struggle to find 
paying roles in theater or film performances). 
132 See Nina Garin, They Love Me, They Love Me Not . . . Fall Out Boy Sells Out Shows and 
has Hit Records – and also Garners Votes as ‘Worst Band,’ SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 30, 2006, 
§ Entertainment, at 17 (“[Fall Out Boy] was once a punk band that blew away Vans Warped Tour 
fans a few years ago . . . .”). 
133 Chris Richards, No, Really, The Privilege Is Ours, Vampire Weekend, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 
2010, at E2 (“[Vampire Weekend’s] Ivy League pedigree rubbed many the wrong way, but instead of 
trying to live it down, Vampire Weekend wisely chose to live it up.”). 
134 See Jon Pareles, Songs From the Heart of a Marketing Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2008, at 
AR1 [hereinafter Pareles, Songs From the Heart].  
135 Id.  
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to satisfy the established tastes of demographic segments of radio audiences they 
want to hold or build.136 
Many other possibilities exist, mostly unexploited so far.  Bands could receive 
advertising dollars by offering “naming rights.”137  Oucho Sparks, Curtis Evans, or 
the Andreas Kapsalis Trio, Chicago based indie groups, could become the “Coca-Cola 
Sparks,” “Curtis Evans for Nike,” or the “Facionable Trio,” in exchange for 
substantial capital infusions.  Or, groups could retain their names as bands, and offer 
naming rights to albums, or songs.  Modofac’s “They Have to be Watching You” could 
be called the “Tide Watch” album, or David Safran’s song, “Starving Time” could be 
called the “Gatorade Ballad.”138 
This, no doubt, is a startling—and instinctively unwelcome—idea for all these 
groups, but it is a way to finance bands, albums and songs. 
Also interesting is the development of targeted advertising, based on 
increasingly rich databases of individual consumer behavior, such as “click tracks,” 
showing what websites a consumer has visited, collected by search engines such as 
Google.139  Most usefully termed, “micro advertising,” the technology permits an 
advertiser to buy access to very narrow groups of persons potentially interested in 
the advertiser’s product, at low prices.140  It also permits musicians with a small fan 
base to sell advertising “space” at low prices. 
Revenue can be generated by selling direct access to the celebrity, much as 
political contributors making larger contributions get to see the candidate in a more 
intimate group setting, and even larger contributors get a “photo-op” with the 
candidate, a brief one-on-one meeting or even—it is rumored—a night in the Lincoln 
Bedroom of the White House.141  Adapting this idea to the popular music setting, a 
musician could give away CDs at a concert and sell the autograph session, for 
twenty-five dollars.  Or, he could offer a post-performance backstage “hangout” 
session for $100 or more.  Virtual hangout sessions also could be offered, which would 
have more value if they include live audio, and perhaps video. 
Technology can be employed more aggressively capitalize on fan desire for 
access, as celebrity status builds.  Bands can offer video games that permit individual 
fans to enter a virtual space and interact with realistic representations of the 
                                                                                                                                     
136 See Kate Fitzgerald, By the Demo:  Music for the Ages, ADVERTISING AGE, July 28, 2003, at 
S3 (highlighting how advertisers use mainstream music to appeal to specific demographics in 
advertisements and commercials). 
137 The phrase “naming rights” usually refers to municipalities who offer major facilities to 
sponsors who get to name the facility in exchange for investments in the general fund of the 
municipality or in specific activities linked to the named facility. See Stadium Naming Rights, 
ESPN (Sept. 29, 2007), http://espn.go.com/sportsbusiness/s/stadiumnames.html. “U.S. Cellular 
Field” in Chicago—the stadium for the Chicago White Sox—is an example of the result.  Id.  
138 See Pareles, Songs From the Heart, supra note 134 (reporting on the growing tendency for 
pop musicians to license music for advertisements and as “many [consumers] see no need to pay for 
[recorded music].  The emerging practical solution is to let music sell something else”). 
139 See Corporate Information – Company Overview, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/ 
corporate/ (last visited May 28, 2010); see also Profiting from Friendship, ECONOMIST, Jan. 30, 2010, 
§ Special Report (“Click-through rates on display ads at sites such as Facebook are a small fraction 
of those that Google commands for its highly targeted search ads.”). 
140 See Profiting from Friendship, supra note 139. 
141 Don Van Natta, Jr., Campaign Finance:  Raising the Money; Party Officials Orchestrated 
White House Sleepovers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1997, at A8. 
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personalities of the band members.  As one might expect, Pete Wentz and Fall Out 
Boy is an early adopter of this strategy.142  Fans can log on to a special Web site that 
permits them to take part with Fall Out Boy in a concert tour in which the fans 
participate in making decisions that determine the success or failure of the tour.143  
In an interview, Pete Wentz said, the game “is part of the band’s dedication to finding 
’ways for people to engage’ with the band beyond albums.”144  The technology used for 
the Fall Out Boy game is primitive; much better software exists now.  For example 
the promoters of the Transformers series of movies offer a game.145  Video games are 
proliferating in which players control the personalities of the characters in the 
game.146  Electronic Arts’ “The Sims 3,”147 is a popular video game that focuses on 
social behavior, allowing players to define detailed characters according to user-
selected personality traits.148  Players can create a new kind of a person that has 
unique desires in life that shapes their destinies in the game.149  These features are 
combined with high quality animation and moviemaking tools.150 
Such techniques permit a band to design and deploy games that permit fans to 
create and interact in movies with the band members.  The band members’ 
personalities would be pre-defined by the band according to its selected persona. 
All of that means more opportunity for artists to compete for investments based 
on the peculiarities of their own art.  But it is unlikely to make it possible for every 
artist to attract it.  Only a subset of them will fulfill business plan expectations, and 
a still smaller subset will be able to make a living as full-time musicians.  
What will all the others do?  Some of them will be forced to give up, as the 
financial pressures of family obligations compel them to take up other, more 
remunerative, lines of work.  They will participate actively in the marketplace for 
five to ten years, and many of them will continue to make music sporadically 
thereafter.  Others will use subsidies available from family or friends and continue 
recording and performing for longer periods—some for their entire lives.  Others will 
remain outside society’s mainstream in informal communities of musicians who 
minimize housing, food and transportation costs by living together.  Such 
arrangements can prolong the period of full-time involvement for another ten to 
fifteen years. 
The income opportunities for most musicians will remain modest—and perhaps 
decline.  The increased demand resulting from the portability of music will be spread 
                                                                                                                                     
142 See Fall Out Boy Trail – Friends or Enemies, FRIENDS OR ENEMIES, http://www. 
friendsorenemies.com/page/falloutboytrail-1 (last visited May 28, 2010). 
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over many more musicians who have access to the marketplace because of the new 
technologies.  The maximum annual income, even for the most successful, will rarely 
exceed $50,000, and most will be lucky to earn $10,000 to $15,000.  The resulting 
labor market likely will be one in which tens of thousands of new artists enter the 
market151 each year, mostly in their late teens and early twenties.  Some will drop 
out each year, as the demands of touring, the cost of recording, or slow sales, 
discourage them and other career or educational opportunities beckon.  Few will still 
be creating music in a serious way when they are in their mid-thirties.  In this 
scenario, the economic lifetime of a musician will be about ten years—not too 
different from that for professional and semi-professional athletes in football.152 
This is not necessarily an unhappy scenario.  Much music will be produced and 
consumed—some of it quite good.  Many more young people than at present will have 
the gratification of having “succeeded” with their art. 153  Then they will “retire” early 
and go on to other careers. 
The major labels and their corporate bureaucrats will fade from the scene, like 
Hollywood’s studio system, newspaper linotype machines and stereotype plates, 
typewriters, and analog tape drives.  Some will be nostalgic for the old order, 
spinning urban legends about how it was better.  Notwithstanding the legends, the 
new music will be better, created by a wider range of artists, and enjoyed by more 
consumers. 
                                                                                                                                     
151 “Entering the market” is defined as completing an album and offering it for sale and/or 
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152 See Joseph N. Geier & Brian J. Woods, Disability Insurance the Only Sure Bet for Pros, 
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